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In this paper we analyze influence maximization in the voter model with an active strategic and a passive
influencing party in non-stationary settings. We thus explore the dependence of optimal influence alloca-
tion on the time horizons of the strategic influencer. We find that on undirected heterogeneous networks,
for short time horizons, influence is maximized when targeting low-degree nodes, while for long time
horizons influence maximization is achieved when controlling hub nodes. Furthermore, we show that for
short and intermediate time scales influence maximization can exploit knowledge of (transient) opinion
configurations. More in detail, we find two rules. First, nodes with states differing from the strategic
influencer’s goal should be targeted. Second, if only few nodes are initially aligned with the strategic
influencer, nodes subject to opposing influence should be avoided, but when many nodes are aligned, an
optimal influencer should shadow opposing influence.
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2000 Math Subject Classification: 34K30, 35K57, 35Q80, 92D25
1. Introduction
Influence maximization –the study of strategically influencing agents on social networks with the aim
to align their opinions or choices with certain targets– has major applications ranging from advertising
and marketing to the political campaign problem [17], analyzing the spread of extreme opinions and
radicalization [15], or limiting the spread of fake news [37]. The underlying diffusion process has been
extensively studied in competitive and non-competitive scenarios [23], mostly via variants of models
based on the seminal independent cascade model [4, 5, 16, 35]. In the independent cascade model
agents are committed to an opinion once affected by contagion, but are not subject to dynamic forces
of opinion change thereafter. Such a scenario may be appropriate when there is an effect of lock-in,
e.g., if agents make one-off decisions about buying an expensive product or generally making decisions
when further change is costly. However, as it has been realized by some authors [9, 25, 29, 43], these
models may not be appropriate in situations in which agents are subject to various sources of social
influence, and decisions can be changed over time. Such decision making can be described by various
types of dynamic models of opinion formation for which there is a rich interdisciplinary literature (see,
c© The author 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Institute of Mathematics and its Applications. All rights reserved.
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e.g., [10] or [40] for recent reviews). One can generally distinguish between models that either consider
opinions as discrete (i.e. as a stance for or against a certain issue under discussion) or as continuous,
expressing gradations of closeness in opinion spaces. Whereas most modeling effort has been devoted
to understanding various facets of opinion dynamics, some recent studies have also started to consider
influence maximization for such dynamic models of opinion formation. In this context, previous work
has focused on exploring optimal control allocations that maximize influence in the stationary state of
the kinetic Ising model [26–28], for the AB model [2] and for the voter dynamics [9, 25, 29, 43].
Here, because of its rich history, we concentrate on the voter dynamics [14, 18] which describes the
dynamic choice between two discrete opinions. Importantly, compared to a contagion model in which
adopting a state is a one-off process, in the voter dynamics agents repeatedly update their opinion states
depending on the state of their social network neighbors, which allows to study influence maximization
in a dynamic scenario in which agent states can switch back and forth. Many exact results about the
voter dynamics are known [10], showing that without external influence a consensus will be reached on
finite networks and infinite low-dimensional lattices [10]. External influence to the voting dynamics,
often also called zealotry, is typically modeled by agents with a bias [31, 33] or unidirectional influence
[34] and can dramatically alter this picture and lead to equilibrium states in which multiple opinions
can coexist. Zealotry in the voting dynamics has been extensively studied [31, 33, 34], with most recent
extensions to linear and non-linear multi-state voter models [20, 22, 32, 41] or studies on the effects of
zealots in the noisy voter model [24].
Recent work [9, 25, 29, 43] has also started to address the question of opinion control in the voter
model. Up to our best knowledge, all work in the area has focused on maximizing vote shares in the
stationary state, finding that albeit centrality measures cannot exactly predict optimal allocations [43]
optimal control will generally focus on high-degree nodes on undirected networks [25, 29], at least if
the resistance of nodes to control is small [9]. However, the transient dynamics of the voting process
can sometimes be long and influence maximization in real-world settings may be targeted at achieving
best results in shorter time frames [17]. Even though previous work provides some approximations for
transient times in the voter model [43], the question of non-stationary influence maximization– the topic
of this paper– has not found much attention for the voter dynamics. Up to our best knowledge, the
only study investigating effects related to non-stationary influence maximization in a voter-like model is
[21] in which the author compares the effectiveness of various ”local” and ”global” influence allocation
strategies. This study, however, does not relate the effectiveness of such strategies to equilibration times
and time horizons of planners in the voting dynamics.
Further, closest to our paper, recent work of Alshamsi et al. [1] has investigated the effects of time
scales in independent-cascade-like models of strategic diffusion when considering complex contagion.
As opposed to simple contagion in which infection of a single neighbor is sufficient to infect a new
node (as, e.g., when considering epidemic spreading [38]), empirical studies have suggested that in
opinion formation reliable contagion requires reinforcement of exposure through multiple sources [11,
12]. Alshamsi et al. show that influence maximizers should target nodes of different degree at different
stages of the contagion process, i.e., starting with low-degree nodes and then hub nodes only when the
cascade has propagated beyond a certain point. However, the model of Alshamsi et al. is not a dynamic
model in the sense of the voter model, i.e., it is not appropriate for situations of fast opinion switching
and does not allow to study the dynamic balance between different sources of influence. This is however
fundamental to model to mimic real-world contexts such as marketing [30] or governmental intervention
strategies (e.g., public health campaigns [42] or radicalization prevention [39]), where two or more
parties compete with each other to influence people towards the adoption a specific opinion. Examples
of this scenario are plenty, e.g., two firms with the same target audience which want to convince people
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to adopt their product over their competitors, or a public campaign in which the government’s aim is
to incentivise people to make healthy lifestyle choices instead of drinking or eating junk food, which
would clash with the influence that companies selling these products would try to exert on people to
become their customers. Moreover, in such scenarios, the time horizon is often fixed and potentially
very short, and analyzing the effect of such a constraint on influence maximization is paramount to
design algorithms that efficiently tackle this problem.
Our results suggest that optimal influencing strategies differ depending on the time horizons of
the strategic influencer. Specifically, we find that low-degree nodes represent better control targets
when the time horizon is short, whereas hubs are ideal targets for long time horizons. Moreover, our
results suggest that optimal strategies vary depending on the initial state of the network. Importantly,
we find that, when many nodes are aligned with the strategic influencer’s opinion, its best strategy
is to neutralize its opponent’s influence. Conversely, when most voters hold a different opinion than
the strategic influencer, the best strategy is to directly target opposing low-degree nodes and avoid the
opponent’s influence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we briefly revisit the voter dynamics on
complex networks and describe the framework we use for influence maximization. In Sec. 3 we outline
our main results, first, by giving analytical arguments for star networks in subsection 3.1 and developing
a mean-field theory for degree heterogeneous networks in subsection 3.2. We then report results from
numerical optimization in 3.3 and, based on these findings, develop static and dynamic heuristics which
are explored in subsections 3.4 and 3.5. The paper concludes with a summary and discussion.
2. Model
In the following we consider the voter model first introduced in [14, 18] on a social network. Each of
N nodes of the network is identified with a voter who can be in two possible states si = A or si = B.
We assume social networks to be undirected, and thus, their adjacency matrices are given by G =
{ai j}Ni, j=1 with ai j = 1 if agent i is connected to agent j and ai j = 0 otherwise. Provided the networks
are connected (or strongly connected in the case of directed networks) the voting dynamics is known
to reach a consensus on finite networks [10]. Hence, on top of the population of social voters we also
consider two influencers – agents labeled A and B who have directed connections to social voters but
are not influenced by them in return. Influencers (or, using the parlance of voter dynamics, zealots) thus
have static opinions sA = A and sB = B and aim to sway the overall vote of the agent population towards
their own opinions. Below, we will be interested in a scenario in which influencer B is passive with a
random allocation of influenced voters. In contrast, we will treat A as active in the sense that we seek
configurations of influenced nodes such that A maximizes its influence on the system. We distinguish
two types of active allocations, which we term static and dynamic below. In static allocations – used
in the majority of the paper except for subsection 3.5 – A decides its influence allocation at time t = 0
and this allocation then remains fixed. In dynamic allocations, treated in subsection 3.5, A changes its
influence allocation dynamically over time.
Voters interact with their network neighbors according to the following dynamics: (i) a voter is
picked at random, (ii) the voter randomly selects one of its incoming network connections, and (iii) the
voter copies the state of the selected in-neighbor. The voter model has been well studied in the literature
(see, e.g. [10] or [40] for reviews) and analytical solutions for various scenarios are available. Here we
follow the approach of Masuda [29], and use the master equation to calculate occupation probability
flows. Let xi be the probability that agent i is in state A. We then have
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∆i
dxi
dt
= (1− xi)(∑
j
a jix j+ pA,i)− xi(∑
j
a ji(1− x j)+ pB,i), (2.1)
where ∆i = ∑ j a ji + pA,i + pB,i and pA,i and pB,i are the control gains, and are set to one if A or B
influence i, respectively, and zero otherwise. In Eq. (2.1) the first term corresponds to voters who hold
opinion B but are converted to opinion A in the current update; the second term gives voters who hold
opinion A but are converted to B due to contact with a voter who holds opinion B. The normalization
1/∆i reflects the choice of incoming links at randomwhen updating opinions. Eq. (2.1) can be simplified
to
∆i
dxi
dt
= pA,i− xi(pA,i+ pB,i)+∑
j
a jix j− xi∑
j
a ji, (2.2)
i.e., we obtain a linear inhomogeneous system of first order differential equations to describe the dynam-
ics of opinion change, where the inhomogeneity is given by the control gains. In previous work, Masuda
[29] has studied optimal opinion control by analyzing stationary states of Eq. (2.2), which can be
obtained by solving the corresponding linear system of equations. Here instead we are interested in
the transient dynamics of system (2.2). In principle, this linear inhomogeneous system could be solved
exactly via eigenvalue decomposition and, e.g., the method of variation of the constant. We will employ
this technique to treat example network configurations below. For numerical results, however, we made
a pragmatic choice and solve (2.2) via numerical integration using a Runge-Kutta method. Step sizes
are chosen as ∆ t = 1/N, so that one integration step could roughly be equated to one discrete update of
votes.
To obtain influence-maximizing configurations for influencer A we thus proceed as follows: (i) start
with a given social network configuration and randomly chosen initial assignments of votes to nodes
(excluding the influencers A and B). To investigate the influence of different initial conditions we set
states of nodes to s= A with probability q and s= B with probability 1−q. We also start with a random
initialization of controls pA,i and pB,i subject to the constraint ∑i pA,i = nA and ∑i pB,i = nB of given
resources nA and nB available to the influencers. (ii) To estimate the influence exerted by A we then
integrate Eq. (2.2) over the interval [0,T ] and record the average influence of A at time T obtained
as XA(T, pA) = 1/N∑i xi(T ). Next, stochastic hill-climbing is used to optimize A’s influence, i.e., we
randomly pick a voter i controlled by A and rewire to a yet uncontrolled voter j if XA(T, pA,i = 0, pA, j =
1) > XA(T, pA,i = 1, pA, j = 0). Note that self-connections or multiple connections are prevented when
suggesting rewiring. Step (ii) is repeated until no further improvements in XA(T ) have been found for a
large number of NR rewiring attempts. We typically set NR = 10N, such that each node has been tested
roughly 10 times before rewiring is aborted.
The focus of our study is on strategies for influence maximization on heterogeneous networks.
Accordingly, we will analytically investigate a simple star network configuration analyze a degree-based
mean-field approximation to gain some intuition about the effects of opinion control targeting hub nodes
when time horizons are finite. We will complement these results with a detailed numerical investigation
of scale-free networks with degree distribution P(k)∝ k−α constructed via the configurationmodel [36].
The choice of this model allows us to investigate dependencies on degree heterogeneity by tuning α ,
noting that, when fixing average degree, networks constructed for α ≫ 1 becomemore and more similar
to regular random graphs [3]. Below, when tuning α we vary proportionality constants to ensure net-
works with the same average connectivity 〈k〉 are compared (and prevent multiple and self-connections
in the process of network generation).
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FIG. 1. (a) Dependence of optimization gain (X
(opt)
A −X (rand)A )/X (rand)A on resources nA available to the active voter when competing
against a passive voter with resource nB = 10 which is randomly allocated. (b) Comparison of time evolution of vote shares for
influence maximization schemes evolved for time horizons T = 1, T = 5, T = 30, and T = 1000 for nA = nB = 10. (c) Dependence
of the fraction of influenced nodes for T = 1,5 and 30 on node degree k. Results are for networks of N = 100 nodes with α = 3
averaged over 100 runs for T 6 30 and 30 runs for T = 1000. Networks have average degree 〈k〉= 3 and initially 50% of votes
have been randomly allocated to both types.
3. Results
We start our analysis with an analytical investigation of a star network, a graph topology which is
found to represent real-world phenomena such as communication patterns in social media [13]. Such
an analysis will give insights about the dependency of node controllability on degree for various time
horizons T. We then proceed with a detailed numerical investigation for larger scale-free networks in
which we demonstrate the robustness of our findings for more complex network topologies and present
further results about refined control strategies that can exploit knowledge of initial conditions when time
horizons are finite.
3.1 Analysis of a star network
We consider a star network consisting of one hub (labeled 0) with k neighbors (labeled 1). More formally
we have ai j = a ji = 1 for i= 0 and j = 1, ...,k and ai j = 0 for all other combinations of i and j. As all
the peripheral nodes (or spokes) k = 1, ...,N are topologically identical, we do not need to discriminate
between them provided initial conditions are the same, i.e., x1(0) = x2(0) = ... = xk(0). We can then
rewrite Eq. (2.1) and obtain
~˙x=
[
1/(k+ 1)
0
]
+
[−1 k/(k+ 1)
1 −1
]
~x, (3.1)
with~x= (x0,x1)
T . The corresponding eigenvalues are
λ1/2 =−1±
√
1− 1
k+ 1
, (3.2)
which determine the time scales of opinion change in the above system. Both eigenvalues are negative,
indicating, as expected, that the stationary state x0= x1= 1 of perfect control is stable for all k. However,
in leading order in k, one has λ1 ≈ −1/(2k) and λ2 ≈ −2+ 1/(2k) already indicating a slow-down
of the convergence towards the stationary state for large k. Solving Eq. (3.1) with initial conditions
x1(0) = x2(0) = ... = xk(0) = 0 we can obtain a solution that gives the dynamics of approaching the
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perfectly controlled state from an initially completely unaligned state. We obtain (for more details, see
Appendix A)
x0(t) = 1+
1
2
e
−
(
1+
√
k
1+k
)
t
(√
k
1+ k
− 1
)
− 1
2
e
(
−1+
√
k
1+k
)
t
(
1+
√
k
1+ k
)
(3.3)
and
x1(t) = 1+
1
2
e
−
(
1+
√
k
1+k
)
t
(√
1+ k
k
− 1
k
)
− 1
2
e
(
−1+
√
k
1+k
)
t
(
1+
√
1+ k
k
)
(3.4)
Our main interest is in the dependence of expressions (3.3) and (3.4) on k with particular emphasis on
hub behavior for large k. Expanding in leading order in k we obtain the following asymptotic behavior
which is identical for x0(t) and x1(t)
x0/1(t)≈ x1(t)≈ 1− exp(−t/(2k)), (3.5)
and thus, since XA(t) = (x0(t)+ kx1(t))/(k+ 1), we obtain XA(t)≈ 1− exp(−t/(2k)). In other words,
Eq. (3.5) shows that hub nodes only become aligned to the target of their influencer at a time scale
proportional to their degrees, i.e., successfully influencing a large degree hub node takes much longer
than gaining control over a lower degree node. Thus, whereas controlling hub nodes may seem a good
strategy in the stationary state [25, 29], if the aim is to optimize vote shares for times t ≪ 2k it is a
better strategy to control lower degree nodes. We will explore this issue in more detail in numerical
experiments in subsection 3.3.
Before proceeding, let us briefly consider a star network which is being influenced by two con-
trollers. System (3.1) will then have to be modified as follows
~˙x=
[
1/(k+ 2)
0
]
+
[−1 k/(k+ 2)
1 −1
]
~x. (3.6)
It is immediate to note that the stationary state of (3.8) now becomes x0 = x1 = 1/2, instead of x0 =
x1 = 1 as in the previous case of a single influencer, i.e., states will stochastically flip between A and B
and, on long time scales, both influencers will be able to exert control over the system to equal amounts.
Eigenvalues now become
λ1/2 =−1±
√
1− 1
k+ 2
, (3.7)
and thus for k > 1 the slowest convergence time is related to Tconv. ≈ k+ 2 instead of Tconv. ≈ k+ 1 for
the scenario with only one controller influencing the central hub. Suppose the system starts in an initial
state of x0 = x1 = 0 perfectly aligned with influencer B. We thus see that in comparison to the scenario
in which only A influences the star the presence of B’s influence tends to extend the time scale at which
A’s influence becomes effective, i.e., we conclude that, in a system initially aligned with B’s influence,
B’s best strategy to maximize its short term success is to shadow A.
3.2 Mean-field analysis of networks with bimodal degree distribution
In subsection 3.1, for the relatively simple case of star networks, we have seen how time scales at which
a node equilibrates depend on its degree. As a result of the slow equilibration dynamics of hub nodes,
it thus became apparent that hub control will result in poor vote share gains in the short run. To add
EFFECTS OF TIME HORIZONS ON INFLUENCE MAXIMIZATION IN THE VOTER DYNAMICS 7 of 22
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
100 101 102 103 104
τ r
e
la
x
degree k
simulation
mean-field
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
10-2 10-1 100 101 102
x
time t
low degree
high degree
(a) (b)
FIG. 2. (a) Evolution of average opinions of low-degree and high-degree nodes over time. (b) Simulation estimates for the
dependence of relaxation times of the opinion dynamics of nodes on their degree and comparison to the mean-field estimate of
Eq. (3.11). Simulations were run on a network of N = 104 nodes with power law degree distribution with exponent α = 3 and
average degree 〈k〉 = 5.8 generated from a configuration model. For (a) trajectories are averaged over 200 independent runs
and nodes with degree larger than 50 were labeled as high degree, whereas other nodes were labeled low-degree nodes. Initial
conditions were all opinions opposed to A and influence of strength one was applied to all nodes from A without any influence
from B.
further support to this finding, we also present an additional argument based on a degree-based mean-
field theory. To explore the effects of hub and periphery control, we then apply this mean-field argument
to a class of random networks with bimodal degree distribution.
To proceed, we group nodes by degree and rewrite Eq. (2.2) for the dynamics of nodes with degree
k
x˙k =−xk+ 1/∆k〈∑
j
a ji〉kx j+ pA,k/∆k, (3.8)
where pA,k and pB,k now denote the amount of influence controller A or B apply to a node of degree k,
∆k = k+ pA,k+ pB,k and 〈· · ·〉k stands for the average over all nodes of degree k. We then approximate
〈∑ j a ji〉k ≈ k〈x〉, where 〈x〉= ∑k kpk/〈k〉xk represents the ”average field” experienced by a node and pk
denotes the fraction of nodes with degree k. Multiplying Eq. (3.8) by kpk/〈k〉 and summing over k, we
obtain an equation for the dynamics of 〈x〉
d
dt
〈x〉=
(
∑
k
k2pk/(〈k〉∆k)− 1
)
〈x〉+∑
k
kpkpA,k/(〈k〉∆k). (3.9)
Equation (3.9) gives a linear first order differential equation for 〈x〉 and can be solved by standard meth-
ods. Assuming, e.g., voters that are initially opposed to the controlling influence, we obtain 〈x〉(t) =
B({pA,k})/A({pA,k})(1− exp(−A({pA,k})t)), where A({pA,k}= 1−∑k k2pk/(〈k〉∆k) and B({pA,k}) =
∑k kpkpA,k/(〈k〉∆k) and both A and B depend on network structure and the influence configurations of
controllers A and B, but we have only emphasized the dependence on pA,k which is of importance for
our later argument. Using the solution of Eq. (3.9) we can find mean-field solutions for the relaxation
dynamics of nodes of degree k by solving Eq. (3.8). To illustrate the effect of different relaxation
times of nodes depending on degree, let us consider a scenario with pB,k = 0 and pA,k = 1 for all k.
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Again assuming xk(0) = 0 and using standard methods to solve this inhomogeneous linear differential
equation, we find
xk(t) =
1
1+ 1/k
(C0 exp(−t)+C1 exp(−At))+C2, (3.10)
with constantsC0,C1 andC2 which are functions of A and B. Following [8, 19], we can approximate an
overall relaxation time via τrelax =
∫ ∞
t=0
xk(t)−xk(∞)
xk(0)−xk(∞)dt and obtain
τrelax ∝
1
1+ 1/k
(3.11)
as a mean-field estimate for the time scale of the relaxation dynamics of a node with degree k in a
degree-heterogeneous network. Thus, as for the star networks considered above, we again emphasize
that relaxation times of nodes are increasing functions of their degrees. This point is also emphasized
by numerical simulations illustrated in Fig. 2, where we explored the relaxation dynamics of scale-free
networks on which every node is influenced with fixed strength by controller A whereas controller B
does not exert any influence. In panel (a) we compare averaged trajectories of opinions of low-degree
(degree6 50) and high degree (degree> 50) nodes. As expected the numerics reveal that the relaxation
of hub nodes is markedly slower than the dynamics of low-degree nodes. More in detail, in panel (b) we
estimated the dependence of relaxation times on degree. Results are in very good agreement with the
mean field estimate of Eq. (3.11).
So far in this section, we have shown that the relaxation of hub nodes is typically slower than that of
low-degree nodes, but have not specifically related these results to scenarios of hub or periphery control,
which is the aim of the remainder of this section. Equation (3.9) gives the dynamics of the mean field
encountered at the end of a randomly chosen link, but we can derive a similar relationship for overall
vote shares XA = 1/N∑
N
i=1 xi = ∑k pkxk by multiplying Eq. (3.8) by pk and summing over k to obtain
d
dt
XA =−XA+ 〈x〉(t)∑
k
kpk/∆k+∑
k
pkpA,k/∆k, (3.12)
which gives another linear first order differential equation for the evolution of X . For initial condition
X(0) = 0 equation (3.12) is solved by
XA(t) =
C({pA,k})B({pA,k})
A({pA,k})
+D({pA,k})+
(
C({pA,k})B({pA,k})
1−A({pA,k})
−D({pA,k})
)
e−t−
− C({pA,k})B({pA,k})
A({pA,k})(1−A({pA,k}))
e−A({pA,k})t , (3.13)
where C({pA,k}) = ∑k kpk/∆k and D({pA,k}) = ∑k pkpA,k/∆k. One notes that generally 1− 1/(1+
pA+pB
〈k〉 )) > A({pA,k}) > 0 (see Appendix ?), where pA = ∑k pkpA,k and pB = ∑k pkpB,k are the aver-
age control allocations per node of controllers A and B. Thus, the slowest time scale in the relaxation
dynamics of 〈x〉(t) is given by e−At . Since also B({pA,k}) > 0 and C({pA,k}) > 0, the last term in Eq.
(3.13) reflects a negative contribution on vote shares which is gradually compensated for as the influ-
ence of controller A spreads over the network. In contrast, the first two summands in Eq. (3.13) relate
to equilibrium vote shares, and the term proportional to e−t describes a fast relaxation dynamics whose
time scales are not influenced by control allocations or network structure.
For a better understanding of effects of control on short time scales we focus on the last term of
(3.13) in the following and highlight differences between hub and periphery control. Detailed results
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will generally depend on the details of control allocation of A and B. However, to illustrate differences
between hub and periphery control we consider a random network composed of equal numbers of nodes
of degrees k1 and k2 > k1 and compare the effects of allocating control of strength p > 0 exclusively to
either all of the hub nodes with degree k2 or to all of the periphery nodes of degree k1. Let us further
assume that all nodes are subject to opposing influence of strength q > 0 from controller B. We thus
have
AH = 1− 1
k1+ k2
(
k21
k1+ q
+
k22
k2+ p+ q
)
(3.14)
BH = pk2
1
k1+ k2
1
k2+ p+ q
(3.15)
CH = 1/2
k1
k1+ q
+ 1/2
k2
k2+ p+ q
(3.16)
for a scenario of exclusive hub control and
AP = 1− 1
k1+ k2
(
k21
k1+ p+ q
+
k22
k2+ q
)
(3.17)
BP = pk1
1
k1+ k2
1
k1+ p+ q
(3.18)
CP = 1/2
k1
k1+ p+ q
+ 1/2
k2
k2+ q
(3.19)
for exclusive periphery control. We next note that AH > AP > 0, i.e. the slowest relaxation dynamics is
faster when focusing control on hub nodes. However, alsoCHBH/(AH(1−AH))>CPBP/(AP(1−AP))
irrespective of p and q as long as k2 > k1 > 0, i.e. control allocation to hub nodes generally incurs a
larger initial loss of vote shares than control allocation to periphery nodes. We thus see that vote shares
are larger for periphery control at short time scales and larger for hub control at longer time scales as
the negative term decays faster in that case.
3.3 Analysis of scale-free networks
In the following we present numerical experiments conducted for networks with scale-free degree dis-
tributions. We start by illustrating the effectiveness of optimization, and plot the dependence of the gain
achievable by optimization on the amount of resource available to the active voter for various time hori-
zons of the optimizer (see Fig. 1a). It becomes clear that optimization gains strongly depend on both
the optimizer’s time horizon and its resource availability, and we can make two observations. First, the
shorter the time horizon, the less exploitable is a passive strategy, and maximum optimization gains are
limited to at most 5% for the shortest time frame we investigated (T = 1). Second, strategic allocation is
the more important the less resource available to the influencer, so that gains are largest at around 50%
for an influencer who can influence nA = 1 node against nB = 10.
In panel Fig. 1b we present data for the optimized average vote share trajectories XA(t) for nA =
nB = 10, for situations optimized for short and long time horizons T = 1,5,30 and T = 1000. The figure
illustrates that it is indeed possible to achieve short term vote share increases, but they come at a cost of
long term reductions in vote shares (e.g., for T = 1 or T = 5). In contrast, far more substantial long-term
vote share gains (e.g, for T = 30 or T = 1000) are also possible, but such gains come at the cost of short
term vote share losses (observe the dips at around t = 50 for T = 30 and T = 1000).
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FIG. 3. Dependence of optimal influence strategies on time horizons T of the influence maximizer: (a) averaged influenced
degrees, and (b) relative standard deviation of distribution of influenced degrees. Bottom row: (c) fraction of opposing initial
opinions, (d) fraction of neighbors of influenced nodes which have opposing initial conditions, and (e) fraction of mutually
influenced votes. Settings are nA = nB = 10 and q = 0.5, i.e., 50% of initial votes are A or B. The data are estimated from 100
runs for t < 30 and 10 runs otherwise. The lines in (b) and (c) indicate a range of one standard deviation around the expectation
for a random allocation.
In panel Fig. 1c we also plot the fraction of influenced nodes as a function of degree for short,
intermediate, and long term control time horizons. It becomes clear that strategic control strategies differ
substantially: whereas optimal control strongly focuses on leaf nodes for T = 1, nodes of intermediate
degree are targeted for T = 5 and control again focuses almost exclusively on hub nodes for long time
horizons as for T = 30 as already observed in other work [29]. Together with our results of long
transients to control hub nodes in Sec. 3.1 we can thus understand the initial decline in vote shares for
long term control: the passive influencer who targets a random selection of nodes can gain short term
vote shares while influence gains of the long term optimizer are initially limited when control of hub
nodes has not yet been achieved.
We proceed with a more systematic investigation of the dependence of optimal influence strategies
on the strategic influencer’s time horizon. For this purpose we have run experiments for varying T and
have recorded statistics about nodes targeted by the optimized control for each optimized configuration.
As before, a key quantity of interest is the degree of controlled nodes, and, consequently, we measure
〈kcontrolled〉=∑i pA,iki/nA where ki denotes the degree of node i. To gain insights about the distribution of
influenced degrees we also record its standard deviation 〈σ2k,controlled〉 = 1/nA∑i pA,i(ki−〈kcontrolled〉)2.
Further, we are interested to measure how strategically optimized control relates to nodes influenced by
the passive influencer and thus measure the fraction 〈 fm〉 = 1/nA∑i pA,ipB,i of nodes influenced by A
which also experience control by B. For randomly allocated influence B one expects 〈 fm〉rand = nB/N.
Thus, 〈 fm〉> 〈 fm〉rand = nB/N indicates crowding of A influence on B-influenced nodes whereas 〈 fm〉>
〈 fm〉rand = nB/N characterizes avoidance of B controlled nodes by A.
EFFECTS OF TIME HORIZONS ON INFLUENCE MAXIMIZATION IN THE VOTER DYNAMICS 11 of 22
Since the stationarity condition of Eq. (2.2) is a linear equation it allows for only one solution and
hence strategies for optimal stationary influence maximization are independent of initial vote alloca-
tions. Importantly, this does not need to be the case for optimal allocations subject to limited time hori-
zons. We thus test for correlations of control allocations with initial vote configurations {xi(0)}Ni=1 by
measuring the average number of influenced nodes with initially opposed votes 〈 fo〉= 1/nA∑i pA,iδB,xi(0)
where δx,y = 1 if x = y and δx,y = 0 otherwise (Kronecker delta). Hence, 〈 fo〉 < 1− q indicates
avoidance of controlling initially opposed votes, whereas for 〈 fo〉 > 1− q optimal control focuses on
influencing initially opposed votes. Similarly, we are also interested in local neighborhoods of con-
trolled nodes. Consequently, we measure the fractions of initially opposed votes amongst an influ-
enced nodes’ neighbors by defining an opposed-neighbor ratio 〈 fno〉 = 1/nA∑i pA,i1/ki∑ j a jiδx j(0),B.
As above, 〈 fno〉 < 1− q indicates avoidance of influencing nodes with many opposed neighbors and
〈 fno〉> 1− q suggests that control is focused on controlling nodes with opposed neighbors.
Numerical result representing averages over 100 network and initial vote allocation configurations
are illustrated in Fig. 3. The top row of panels in Fig. 3 plots characteristics of the distribution of
influenced degrees vs. optimization time horizons. From panel Fig. 3a we see that there is indeed a
transition between a regime of lowest-degree node control and a regime of hub control, leaving only a
limited range of time horizons for which intermediate degree control is optimal. Plots of the relative
standard deviations in Fig. 3b show that control tends to be most focused on low (high) degree nodes for
short (long) time horizons, with least focus for intermediate time scales when both high and low degree
nodes are targeted in the optimal control allocation.
In the bottom row of panels of Fig. 3 we present further results on changes of correlations of optimal
control allocations with initial conditions and the opponent’s influence allocation with time horizons. As
expected, 〈 fo〉 ≈ q= 0.5 and 〈 fno〉 ≈ q= 0.5 for T ≫ 1, i.e., no statistically significant correlations with
initial configurations are observed when time horizons approach the stationary scenario. In contrast,
for small T and for intermediate T respectively, marginal and very strong correlations are found. More
specifically, we see that optimal allocations mostly target nodes with opposing neighbors for very small
T (Fig. 3d), an effect that gradually diminishes as T is increased. For intermediate time scales, the
strategic influencer no longer focuses on opposed neighbors of controlled nodes, but instead selects
controlled nodes based on their own initial states (see Fig. 3c). Thus, whilst for small T it mostly
matters to influence a low degree node with initially opposed neighbors for intermediate T the focus
should be on influencing nodes whose initial votes differ from the influencers’ target. Finally, panel Fig.
3e shows data for the variation of correlations with the opposing controllers’ influence 〈 fm〉 with T . We
can again distinguish three regimes. For small T we have 〈 fm〉< 0.1= nB/N and thus strategic control
is found to avoid nodes influenced by the passive influencer. This effect diminishes for intermediate T
and finally for close to stationary control no significant correlation between targeted nodes and passively
controlled nodes is found.
These results suggest that optimal influence allocations for short and intermediate time horizons are
strongly influenced by the initial configuration of votes on the social network. To explore this effect
further we carried out numerical experiments in which we varied the fraction of initially aligned votes
q. Results are summarized in the panels of Fig. 4. As above in Fig. 3, we analyze the average controlled
degree 〈kcontrolled〉, the fraction of influenced voters with initially opposed votes and fraction of initially
opposed neighbors of influenced nodes (which we normalize now by 1− q to account for the varying
fraction of opposed votes), and the fraction of mutually influenced votes. We observe that all quantities
show a significant dependence on q as long as time horizons are short, but, as expected, q-dependencies
vanish when approaching stationary control.
In more detail, Fig. 4a shows that the transition between optimal low and high degree control
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FIG. 4. Dependence of optimal influence strategies on time horizons T of the influence maximizer for different initial configura-
tions characterized by the initial fraction of aligned votes q: (a) averaged influenced degrees, (b) normalized fraction of opposing
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there are no curves for q = 0 and q = 1 in (b) and (c), as correlations with initial conditions are meaningless for homogeneous
initial conditions.
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FIG. 5. Dependence of average controlled degree 〈kcontrolled〉 on time horizons of the influencer for different degrees of network
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q= 0 (a), q= 0.5 (b), and q= 1.0 (c). Other settings are nA = nB = 10, N = 100. The data are estimated from 100 runs for t < 30
and 10 runs otherwise.
systematically depends on q. The larger the fraction of initially aligned votes, the larger the low degree
control regime, but also the less significant the difference between optimally targeted nodes in both
regimes (cf. the curve for q= 1 in Fig. 4a). In fact, as for q= 1 the control allocation almost exclusively
focuses on shadowing the opposing controller, no focused lowest-degree control regime exists. Further,
in Fig. 4b the importance of targeting opposing votes is shown to also be a function of time horizons
and initial conditions. In particular, we notice that, for intermediate time horizons, controlling initially
opposed votes becomes the more important the less initially opposed votes are present in the initial
state. Again, controlling nodes with initially opposed neighbors is only relevant for very short time
horizons when only leaf nodes are targeted and the transition from this regime towards a regime in
which opposing-neighbor control becomes irrelevant is roughly independent of initial conditions (see
Fig. 4c and notice that for T < 5 in all cases only leaf nodes with an initially opposing neighbor are
targeted).
Finally, in Fig. 4d we investigate the relevance of neutralizing the passive influencer by shadowing
its allocation as measured by 〈 fm〉. Depending on time horizons and initial state, three regimes exist.
First, for large time horizons we observe 〈 fm〉= 0.1= nB/N, i.e. optimal allocations are neutral relative
to the passive control. However, for short and intermediate time horizons this is different. In a second
regime, for short and intermediate T and relatively low numbers of initially unaligned votes (roughly
q< 0.5) we find 〈 fm〉 ≈ 0. In other words: in this regime optimal control avoids the passive controller. In
contrast, if a larger fraction of roughly q> 0.7 initial votes is already aligned with the active controller
〈 fm〉 > 0.1 = nB/N, i.e. optimal strategies aim to target the passive control. This is particularly the
case in at intermediate time horizons (cf. curves for q = 0.7 and q = 1.0). In the extreme case of
initial conditions perfectly aligned with the active controller for q = 1 shadowing becomes particularly
evident: here the best strategy clearly is to neutralize the passive controller by perfectly shadowing
nodes influenced by her. As our model does not allow for perfect neutralization, the influence of the
passive controller will always penetrate the system on very long time scales and thus perfect shadowing
of the passive controller will not necessarily make sense for stationary control. However, aiming at
shadowing the passive controller for short time horizons can extend the time scale at which its influence
can propagate and is thus a viable strategy (see also Sec. 3.1).
Hence, we see that the reasons for low degree control are twofold, but both are related to time
scales at which influence over certain nodes on the social network can be gained. As illustrated in our
example of a star network in Sec. 3.1, one reason relates to the long transient time required to gain
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FIG. 6. Dependence of vote shares at (a) very short (T = 1), (b) intermediate (T = 4.5) and (c) long (T = 50) time scales on
average degrees of controlled nodes on scale-free networks with α = 3, 〈k〉= 3 of size N = 104 . Other settings are nA = nB = 103
and data points represent averages over 10 runs.
influence over high degree nodes. As just demonstrated, the second reason relates to extending the time
scales at which an opposing influencer can gain control over a node already aligned with the active
influencer which can be extended by opposing the other influencers control. The relative relevance of
both aspects depends on initial conditions: when many initial votes are not aligned, the first aspect
becomes the dominant consideration. However, if many nodes are initially aligned with the controller,
then the second consideration becomes paramount.
As a last point in this section we address the dependence of the optimal low- and high degree
control schemes on network heterogeneity. For this purpose we construct networks with varying degree
exponent α as described in Sec. 2. Results for different initial vote allocations are given in the panels
of Fig. 5. Cross comparison of panels (a)-(c) which represent different q show that transitions are
dependent on initial conditions, generally allowing for an extended low-degree control regime when
initial votes are mostly aligned with the strategic controller. In contrast, apart from an expected rise in
the average maximum degree when varying α , comparison of very heterogeneous networks with α = 2
and almost regular networks for α = 10 does not show a significant difference for all investigated q.
Low- and high-degree control regimes are thus largely independent of network heterogeneity.
3.4 Heuristics
Above, we have investigated optimal control strategies by numerical optimization of votes shares for
relatively small networks and the question arises if these results for small systems generalize to larger
networks for which optimization is not computationally feasible with limited resources. To address this
issue we have evaluated heuristics for strategies on larger networks. For this purpose, we assign nodes
scores based on their degree, initial conditions, correlations with initial conditions of neighbors, and
correlations with the passive controller
Si =| ki− ktarget | −a1xnbi (0)− a2δxi(0),B− a3δpA,i,pB,i (3.20)
where xnbi (0) = 1/ki∑ j a jiδx j(0),B is the fraction of B-neighbors of i and ktarget gives the degree of nodes
to be targeted. The coefficients a j, j= 1,2,3 allow to tune the relative influence of various criteria in the
heuristic and we typically set a j = 1 (or a j =−1) if criterion i is accounted for as a positive or negative
influence in the heuristic (or a j = 0 if the criterion is ignored). The choice of a j ∈ {−1,0,1} allows for
limited trade-off in degree heterogeneity to allow meeting other criteria and results presented below are
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Heuristic (a1,a2,a3)
T = 1.0 T = 4.5
q= 0.1 q= 0.9 q= 0.1 q= 0.9
(1,0,0) 0.16± 0.01 2.3± 0.1 0.8± 0.1 4.8± 0.2
(−1,0,0) −0.16± 0.01 −0.9± 0.1 0.2± 0.1 −1.1± 0.1
(0,1,0) 0.03± 0.01 2.1± 0.1 0.4± 0.1 1.9± 0.2
(0,−1,0) −0.10± 0.01 0.0± 0.1 0.0± 0.1 0.4± 0.2
(0,0,1) −0.16± 0.01 0.9± 0.1 −0.1± 0.1 3.7± 0.2
(0,0,−1) 0.06± 0.01 −0.3± 0.1 0.5± 0.1 −1.1± 0.2
best
(1,1,−1) (1,1,1) (1,1,-1) (1,1,1)
0.24± .02 3.1± 0.1 1.2± 0.1 8.1± 0.3
Table 1. Evaluation of heuristics based on Eq. (3.20) for different initial fractions of aligned votes q and very short and interme-
diate time horizons T = 1.0 and T = 4.5. Values in the table give the maximum achievable gain of the heuristic (when varying
ktarget) relative to the range of variation observed in purely degree-based heuristics, i.e. 0.16 for heuristic (1,0,0) for q = 0.1
means that the heuristic can achieve an improvement of 16% relative to improvements that can be achieved by tuning average
targeted degrees alone. The last row lists best heuristics and gives relative gains achievable. The data are based on simulations
performed for networks of size N = 104 for which experiments with varying ktarget have been run, cf. Fig. 6 for each heuristic.
robust for other choices of small values of a j and we have not observed any situation in which choices
of large values of a j would result in markedly superior performance.
For instance, we have evaluated purely degree-based heuristics (i.e. a1 = a2 = a3 = 0) by system-
atically varying ktarget and evaluating vote shares at different time horizons. Results for different initial
conditions and short, intermediate, and long time horizons are summarized in Fig. 6, in which we plot
the dependence of normalized vote share differences X(k)/X(1)− 1 on the average controlled degree
which we have tuned by varying ktarget, where X(1) denotes vote shares when only nodes of degree one
are influenced. Confirming our results above, it becomes clear that a strategy of lowest-degree control is
always superior for short time horizons (cf. Fig. 6a) whereas highest-degree control is always optimal
in the long run (cf. Fig. 6c). For both time scales relative gains for the best allocations can be substantial
with the largest differences occurring when the influence of the active controller in the initial state is
small. In contrast, for intermediate time scales relative differences of degree-based heuristics are very
small. Nevertheless, we also observe that, for intermediate time scales, optimal control can be achieved
by targeting nodes of intermediate degree (cf. Fig. 6b for q = 0.1. Similar peaks can be observed for
other values of q but at different T ).
For a more comprehensive evaluation of the proposed heuristics, we have run simulations to evaluate
the dependence on ktarget for all 27 heuristics for different initial conditions and short and intermediate
time horizons. We have not investigated very long time horizons, as no significant correlations are
expected in this case. Results of gains relative to gains achievable by target-degree tuning are summa-
rized in Tab. 1, where we list results for each individual factor in Eq. (3.20) and also give the best
combination of factors for each parameter setting. In agreement with observations above, we always
find a positive influence of a1, i.e., targeting nodes surrounded by many opposed votes enhances vote
share gains for short and intermediate time scales, whereas seeking out nodes surrounded by many
aligned votes has the opposite effect. A smaller positive effect is found for a2 parameterizing correla-
tions with initial conditions of the targeted node itself. Effects of opponent shadowing measured by a3,
on the other hand, depend on initial conditions. Confirming our earlier results in subsection 3.3 we find
positive effects of opponent avoidance for non-aligned initial settings (q = 0.1), and positive effects of
opponent shadowing for largely aligned initial settings (q= 0.9).
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3.5 Dynamic heuristics
Our main finding suggests that, when deciding about a one-off selection of nodes to target, influence-
maximizing strategies should select low-degree nodes at short time horizons and high degree nodes for
long time horizons. The natural question arises whether a dynamic allocation scheme that re-assigns
targeted nodes over time could combine the short term benefits of low-degree allocations with the long-
term gains of hub allocations?
To address this question, we will consider dynamic influence allocation schemes in this section.
We will consider two degree-based settings. In a first setting, initially the nA lowest degree nodes are
targeted and then control is systematically shifted towards larger degree nodes as the dynamics of voting
unfolds. More in detail, as we numerically integrate Eq. (2.2), in each integration step with probability
kr control is removed from the controlled node with the lowest degree and rewired to the uncontrolled
node with the smallest degree that is higher than the degree of the previously controlled node. In this
way average degrees of controlled nodes are increased at a rate proportional to kr over time. Second, we
consider a targeting scheme in which the nA highest degree nodes are targeted.
Both of the above two schemes generally allow for some degeneracy as multiple different nodes
fulfill these purely degree-based criteria. We further select the nodes to be targeted among all nodes
of degree equal to the selected nodes, based on fractions of uncontrolled neighbors either in the initial
or estimated current state of the system based on Eq. (2.2). We thus compare the following static and
dynamic schemes:
• (static hubs): targeting hubs, resolving degeneracy by selecting nodes with largest fractions of
initially opposed neighbors,
• (dynamic hubs): target hubs, resolve degeneracy by selecting nodes with largest estimated average
deviation of neighbors 1/ki∑a jix j(t) from the controller,
• (increase degree, one-off): increase average degree at rate kr, resolve degeneracy by targeting
nodes with largest fraction of initially opposed neighbors,
• (increase degree, dynamic): increase average degree at rate kr, resolve degeneracy by selecting
nodes with largest estimated average deviation of neighbors 1/ki∑a jix j(t) from the controller.
The increasing-degree schemes require tuning of the rate of increase of degrees kr. Clearly, if kr is
too large, the scheme quickly shifts to hub control and effects of low-degree control cannot become
effective. On the other hand, if kr is too small, longer term losses of vote shares as observed in Fig. 1b
might ensue. The resulting trade-off is analyzed in Fig. 7a in which we plot simulation results for the
dependence of time averaged vote shares
XA = 1/(NT )
∫ T
0
∑
i
xi(t)dt (3.21)
vs. the rate of increase of degrees kr for a one-off and a dynamic increasing degree scheme. We typically
chose T = 300 which is long enough for system composed of 103 nodes to reach a stationary state, but
not too long as to hide effects from the transient dynamics (cf. Fig. 7b). Even though differences
in time-averaged vote shares turn out to be very small, a clear maximum can be identified for both
cases and we notice that vote shares achievable in dynamic schemes can indeed be slightly larger than
vote shares obtained when statically targeting hubs (maximum vote shares are XA = 0.553± 0.001 and
XA = 0.557± 0.001 vs. XA = 0.550± 0.001). Further, we observe that degeneracy resolution based
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FIG. 7. (a) Evaluation of dynamic heuristics: dependence of time averaged vote shares on growth rate of average degree kr for a
dynamic heuristic based on initial settings (”one-off”) and a heuristic based on reallocations making use of projections from the
master equation (”dynamic”). The arrows indicate the maxima for kr = 0.55 and kr = 0.8. For comparison, note that for one-off
hub allocation one finds XA = 0.550± 0.001 and for dynamic hub allocation one has XA = 0.555± 0.001. (b) Comparison of
the evolution of vote shares for a static allocation to hubs, allocation to hub nodes subject to dynamical re-allocation, and using
the optimal dynamical degree heuristic. (c,d): Dependence of the average number of vote-share based reallocations and average
controlled degree on time for the optimal dynamic degree-dependent heuristic. For all experiments show initial conditions are
balanced (q= 0.5) and trajectories represent averages over 100 runs for a system of size N = 103 with nA = nB = 10
2 for scale-free
networks with α = 3 and 〈k〉= 6.
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on correlations with estimated current states result in improved performance (XA = 0.557± 0.001 vs.
XA = 0.553±0.001 for increasing degree schemes and XA = 0.555±0.001 vs. XA = 0.550±0.001 for
dynamic or static hub targeting).
In Fig. 7b, we compare the resulting average trajectories of vote shares over time for the optimal
degree-increasing dynamic scheme are compared with trajectories for hub-based static and dynamic
schemes, and we notice two effects of interest. First, degree increasing schemes can indeed avoid the
initial drop in vote shares and instead result in a slight initial gain (compare Fig. 7b with Fig. 1b).
Second, by adaptively seeking out high-degree nodes with largest opposed neighbor fractions, dynamic
targeting can also improve stationary performances. Panels (c) and (d) of Fig. 7 further show the change
in the average controlled degree and average numbers of degeneracy resolution moves for the optimal
dynamic degree-increasing scheme. We roughly see two different regimes in the plot of the average
number of degeneracy resolution moves (Fig. 7c): (i) whilst degrees are increasing control of roughly
10 and (ii) when degrees have been allocated to the highest degree nodes control of roughly 1 controlled
nodes of equal degree are changed based on vote share estimates. We thus see that vote shares in
the stationary state which are enhanced in comparison to static settings indeed result from an ongoing
process of adaptive control re-assignment.
4. Discussion
Previous literature on influence maximization in the voter model [25, 29, 43] has assumed long time
horizons and thus been restricted to the analysis of stationary states of the voting dynamics. However,
in real-world settings influence maximizers may often have limited time horizons which might be very
short in some situations. Accordingly, in this paper we have analyzed the effect of an influence max-
imizer’s time horizon on optimal strategies for strategic influence maximization in the usual two-state
voter model.
Our analysis makes clear that influence maximization strategies depend on time horizons: Whereas
long time horizons require mainly hub control, for short time horizons control is optimized by targeting
low degree nodes. Using the example of a star network and developing a degree-basedmean-field theory
we have shown that the shift in control regimes is caused by a dependence on degree of effective time
scales a controller needs to gain control over a node. Time scales to control hub nodes are long whereas
control of low degree nodes can be reached more quickly.
As a second contribution, we have shown that in limited time-horizon control knowledge of the
system’s initial state can be exploited and optimal control strategies differ depending on details of the
initial vote allocation and the exact time horizon of the optimizer. We have found three general rules of
thumb to characterize optimal influencing strategies for the short and intermediate time horizon. First,
we have argued that when many initial votes are aligned with the controller, the controller should aim
to neutralize opposing influence. Second, if many initial votes differ from the controller’s target, a
controller is best served by targeting low-degree nodes with opposing initial vote. Interestingly, similar
to findings for synchrony-enhancing arrangements of anti-correlated native frequencies in diffusively
coupled oscillator populations [6–8], such a strategy maximizes the corresponding interaction terms in
the equation of motion. Third, for short time horizons controllers should focus on targeting nodes with
large fractions of neighbors with opposed initial votes. Having identified these heuristics optimizing
control for small networks, we have also demonstrated their effectiveness for larger networks.
It is interesting to note that, in spite of very different modeling assumptions, our results agree with
the findings of Alshamsi et al., who analyzed influence maximization for complex contagion [1]. It
may be arguable if the voter model can be considered a model of complex contagion as one single
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exposure is enough to change the state of a voter. However, on aggregate, a voter has higher likelihoods
of assuming an opinion the more of its neighbors already hold that opinion, so that it might reflect the
repeated exposure criterion in some averaged sense. Notwithstanding these differences, in both models,
time scales to gain control of a node depend on the node’s degrees and thus the balance of optimality
changes from low-degree to hub control depending on how far influence has already penetrated the
system.
With our findings we have demonstrated that for one-off degree-based control allocations optimal
long term control will necessarily suffer losses in vote shares in the short term. As we have shown,
such losses can be avoided, when making use of dynamic allocations which target nodes with differ-
ent degrees over time. More precisely, average targeted degrees of nodes should be increased at an
intermediate rate which is low enough to allow gains from low-degree effects to become effective at
short time scales, but fast enough to avoid losses from suboptimal targeting in the stationary state. Fur-
ther, our results have shown that additional improvements can be made for the optimal degree-changing
dynamics, by selecting between nodes of equal degree, and dynamically switching to nodes with largest
average neighbor deviation in estimated vote shares to the controllers target state.
Our study above has been limited to undirected networks, but some conclusions for the more general
case of directed networks are straightforward. Our analysis in Sec. 3.1 and Sec. 3.2 has show that
influence gain time scales are essentially related to a node’s in-degree. Hence, one can expect different
results for directed networks for which a node’s in- and out-degrees are different. Our results suggest
that low-in-degree out-degree hubs should be targeted independent of time horizons while in- and out-
degree hubs should only be targeted when the controller’s time horizon is long. Subtle differences
between directed and undirected networks may motivate a more detailed investigation in future work.
It is worth noting that unlike other work in the area on competitive diffusion [16] we have treated the
opposing party as passive (or randomly) allocated in our study. Some of our results, however, suggest
that for certain initial network configurations optimal influencers should shadow passively allocated
influence, which is not the case for long time horizons. These findings suggest that time scales could also
be crucial in competitive settings and thus a game theoretic study of competitive influence maximization
with players who act on the same or different short and intermediate time horizons should be of interest
for future work.
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Appendix A
In this section we show in more detail the derivations of Eq. (3.3) and Eq. (3.4). To obtain expressions
(3.3) and (3.4), we solve the non-homogeneous autonomous system (3.1) by finding the general solution
first, and then the particular solutions matched to the initial conditions. Equation (3.1) can be rewritten
as:
~˙x(t) =~g+A~x(t) (4.1)
Let us now define the fundamental matrix, i.e., the matrix that solves the corresponding homogeneous
system, as:
ϕ =

 eλ1~ξ1 eλ2~ξ2

 (4.2)
where (λi) and (~ξi) represent the eigenvalues and the eigenvectors of the system, respectively. Let us
also define~c as the vector of constants. Then,
~x(t) = ϕ (t)
∫
ϕ−1(t)~gdt+ϕ(t)~c (4.3)
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is the general solution of the system. For the system described by Eq. (3.1), recalling that the
eigenvalues are represented in Eq. (3.2) and that the eigenvectors are:
ξ 1 =
[
−
√
k
1+k
1
]
,ξ 2 =
[√
k
1+k
1
]
,
we can derive the fundamental matrix, which is
ϕ =

−e(−1−
√
k
k+1 )t
√
k
1+k e
(−1+
√
k
k+1 )t
√
k
1+k
e
(−1−
√
k
k+1 )t e
(−1+
√
k
k+1 )t

 ,
By integrating over t the product of the inverse of φ and the non-homogenous part~g, we can find the
value of the integral in Eq. (4.3), which is:
∫
ϕ−1(t)~gdt =

 − e
(t+
√
k
k+1
)t
2(k+
√
k(1+k))
e
(t−
√
k
k+1 )t k+
√
k(1+k)
2k

 ,
Now, to find the values of ~c, we solve the system described by Eq. (4.3) for the initial conditions
x0(0) = x1(0) = 0, and obtain
~c=
[
− 1+2k
4k
1−2
√
k(1+k)
4k
]
,
By substituting the so obtained values of~c,
∫
ϕ−1(t)~gdt and ϕ in Eq. (4.3), and some further algebra,
we obtain:
x0(t) = 1+
1
2
e
−
(
1+
√
k
1+k
)
t
(√
k
1+ k
− 1
)
− 1
2
e
(
−1+
√
k
1+k
)
t
(
1+
√
k
1+ k
)
x1(t) = 1+
1
2
e
−
(
1+
√
k
1+k
)
t
(√
1+ k
k
− 1
k
)
− 1
2
e
(
−1+
√
k
1+k
)
t
(
1+
√
1+ k
k
)

